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In this brief paper, I will defend the position that while sentient animals are 
morally considerable, we are not normally morally required to assist suffer-
ing wild animals, though this does not mean that it is ethically impermissi-
ble to do so. I will argue that this position can be defended without denying 
that we have obligations to assist distant suffering humans, and that it need 
not rely on the claim that there is something wrong with intervening in 
human-independent processes (“the wild”). For the purposes of this paper 
I will just assume that sentient animals are morally considerable. This view 
is widely accepted and not particularly controversial (see Palmer 2010 for a 
more substantial defense of this view). 
What is owed to wild animals in terms of assistance has been relatively 
little discussed. Understandably, the first priority of those defending sen-
tient animals’ moral importance has, historically, been the systematic harms 
undergone by agricultural and laboratory animals. But most such positions 
in animal ethics are extensions of approaches to human ethics on which 
we should, at least to some degree, assist people who are suffering, even 
distant people whom we have never met. For example: most forms of ethi-
cal consequentialism aim at reducing distant suffering as (normally) likely 
to bring about the best consequences (Singer 1972). And even though on 
most deontological ethical positions our strongest duties are not to harm, 
weak positive duties of benevolence are still generally accepted (O’Neill 
1986; Pogge 2007). It seems consistent, then, that if distant humans should 
be assisted to reduce suffering, so too should distant animals. After all, if 
as Singer (1979) argued, we should extend the “basic principle of equality” 
to non-human animals; and as he also argued (1972) we should give until 
we reach the level of marginal utility in order to assist those people who 
are distant and suffering, then it seems to follow that we should also try to 
reduce the suffering of wild animals, at least where we can do so “without 
sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance” (Singer 1972). Cer-
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tainly, many environmental ethicists have interpreted positions like Singer’s 
in this way: Sagoff (1984), for instance, maintains: “The liberationist must 
morally require society to relieve animal suffering wherever it can at a lesser 
cost to itself, whether in the chicken coop or in the wild”. 
However, while some philosophical (and religious) positions are driven 
by the imperative to reduce suffering, including animal suffering, wherever 
possible, there is considerable unease – especially among environmental 
ethicists – about a moral requirement to intervene to reduce wild animal 
suffering. One reason for this – more formally defended in environmental 
ethics, but with considerable popular appeal – is the idea that “wildness” 
or “naturalness” should be preserved: “[…] human intentional processes 
need to be circumscribed in such a way that the human-independent 
processes are left intact” (Preston 2011). But even without defending the 
high value-significance of wildness, a requirement for human intervention 
in the wild for humane purposes can be seen as both over-demanding and 
over-reaching. Trying to reduce (non-anthropogenic) suffering in the non-
human world is an enormous and demanding task; and, plausibly, another 
exercise of human (or perhaps, humane) power, intent on shaping the 
entire world to fit human preferences. 
This prompts the question whether humane wild intervention is a nec-
essary commitment of any consistent form of animal ethics that defends 
animals’ moral importance. I will argue here that it is not – though not 
because there is something wrong with intervening in human independent 
processes, nor because intervention is over-demanding or over-reaching; 
but rather because we just do not have such obligations to assist wild ani-
mals. 
First, though, the question needs to be stated more precisely. Rights 
theories (whether of humans and/or animals) that defend only negative 
rights do not generate requirements to assist others (except to protect 
negative rights from being violated). Regan’s (1984) account of animal 
rights, for instance, focuses on the instrumentalization of animals, and on 
animals’ negative rights, such as the right not to be killed; he does not 
defend positive rights (for instance, to food, medical care, or rescue); and 
he is clear that moral agents do not have duties to intervene in preda-
tion to prevent suffering. A negative rights view, then, can consistently 
defend animals’ moral importance without any commitment to humane 
wild intervention. But such a view – in the human case at least – seems 
incomplete, suggesting that we have no obligations to assist anyone – for 
instance, to rescue a drowning child from a shallow pond in front of us. 
So the more precise question here is whether humane wild intervention 
is a necessary commitment of any consistent form of animal ethics that 
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defends animals’ moral importance and accepts that we do have some 
obligations to assist others, but where these obligations don’t extend to 
include wild animals. 
What I will call “contingent consequentialist arguments” defend 
something like this position. Either because of our ecological ignorance 
(Singer 1973) or because of the long-term benefits of leaving evolutionary 
processes undisturbed (Everett 2001) we should not intervene in wild eco-
systems to reduce suffering. This is not because there is something valuable 
about human-independent processes, but rather because such wild inter-
ventions, over time, risk causing more, rather than less, suffering, including 
wild animal suffering; so, from a consequentialist perspective, we should 
not intervene. It is perfectly consistent with this view that we should assist 
distant suffering people, if the expected consequences of doing so are to 
reduce overall suffering.
As presented here, this consequentialist argument is contingent on the 
expectation that wild intervention, over time, can be expected to cause 
more suffering than it relieves. But this is not obviously the case. We can 
certainly think of one-off interventions that are extremely unlikely to have 
this effect. And there are likely to be more systematic, repeatable interven-
tions (for instance: the use of wildlife contraceptives for particular rapidly 
growing populations, vaccination against extremely painful diseases, or 
mercy-killing animals that will shortly die painfully anyway) that we can 
surely reasonably expect to cause less suffering than they relieve over time, 
even if we take into account alternative uses of the resources that would 
need to be employed to carry out such interventions. Ignorance of the 
consequences is not a resilient argument that management of the wild is 
ethically undesirable in principle; and given technological advances, such 
ignorance will apply to a diminishing number of cases in practice, at least 
where such actions are on a relatively small scale. So such contingent, con-
sequentialist positions look as though they will, normally, actually require 
some assistance to wild animals.
It is possible, however, that some kind of rule-consequentialism, or 
Harean two-level utilitarianism (see Varner 2011) could propose a set of 
rules on which at least some interventions to relieve wild animal suffering 
would be impermissible, on the grounds that there is at least a good chance 
that their expected consequences would increase animal suffering. How-
ever, these rules would have to be multiple and specific, since a general 
rule that humane wild intervention should not be undertaken because it 
increases suffering is (I am arguing) empirically implausible. 
These more complex consequentialist positions, though, look very dif-
ferent from my argument here.
Clare Palmer
206
Relations – 3.2 - November 2015
http://www.ledonline.it/Relations/
The argument I will now develop is non-consequentialist, non-con-
tingent and clearly distinct from the positions so far considered. It does 
not rest on the value of non-intervention into human-independent natural 
processes; it does not claim that human interventions in the wild are nor-
mally expected to increase animal suffering; and it does have a place for 
assistance to suffering distant humans – and domesticated animals, for that 
matter. I will call this the contextual view. 
This contextual view I should immediately note, does not defend a non-
interventionist view in the sense that intervention is impermissible (this was 
an implication both of a view based on the value of human-independent 
processes and contingent consequentialist arguments as I have described 
them). It defends, instead, a non-interventionist view in the sense that 
intervention in wild nature to relieve wild animal suffering, or otherwise to 
assist wild animals, is not required, although it may be permissible.
This contextual view has two significant features. One feature (shared 
with negative rights views) flows from its non-consequentialism: it does 
not primarily aim at best consequences, but rather concerns constraints on 
harmful actions (taking harms in something like Feinberg’s [1992] sense 
to mean the wrongful setting back of significant interests). Harms, in this 
sense, are understood to impose on someone, depriving them of something 
they would have had, had we not acted as we did (Kamm 2007); harms 
make someone worse-off. On this part of the contextual view alone, other 
things being equal, we should not harm morally considerable beings includ-
ing wild animals. However, that we should not harm does not, on this view, 
mean we have duties to assist. Assistance, as Kamm (2007) argues, makes 
someone better-off; to assist is an imposition on the agent, rather than on 
the individual being assisted (assuming that we are not wholly or partly 
responsible for their situation). When we harm, we change an individual’s 
independent situation for the worse; when we do not assist, we merely fail 
to improve on what the individual would have independently of us. On this 
view, while we should not make individuals (whether humans or sentient 
animals) worse-off on account of their dealings with us, we have no general 
duties to make them better-off at our own expense. So, on this view, there 
is no general duty to impose on ourselves in order to intervene in the wild 
to make animals better-off.
But while, on this view, we do not have general duties to assist others, 
we may still have special obligations to help others, obligations that are not 
in principle owed to everyone, but that rather emerge from certain morally-
relevant contexts, histories, relations and entanglements. Arguments that 
we have special obligations are commonplace in human ethics, though have 
been much less frequently defended in animal ethics. For instance, the idea 
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that we have special obligations to care for our own children that we do not 
have to other children is widely accepted, even though we normally con-
sider all children to be morally considerable and to have similar morally-
relevant capacities (for instance, see O’Neill 1979). 
In the case of animals, the contextual argument maintains that animals’ 
capacities, such as sentience, are not all that is relevant to determining what 
they are owed; certain relations can create special moral obligations. For 
instance, just as bringing a dependent and therefore vulnerable child into 
the world can be argued to create a special obligation to care for it, so too 
can breeding a dependent, and therefore vulnerable, animal. Although these 
arguments can take different forms (see Palmer 2010), their broad thrust is 
that where humans have deliberately created relations of dependent vulner-
ability with animals (especially where this involves prior harms, such as wild 
capture), special obligations to care for these animals, and to assist them, 
are also created. Related arguments can be made for requirements to assist 
those who are distant and suffering in the human case: the entanglements of 
human societies, in particular the social and structural connections between 
virtually all people, connections that benefit some while causing suffering to 
others, provide a basis for human obligations to assist other humans (see for 
instance, Pogge 2007). Certain kinds of human and animal entanglements, 
then, especially where they benefit some and lead to vulnerability and the 
potential for suffering to others, create special moral obligations to assist.
However, such special obligations to assist do not extend to truly wild 
animals – by which I mean animals that have not been selectively bred, 
trapped, confined or restrained, and are still living their lives relatively 
independent of human contact. Our lives are not entangled with theirs – in 
particular, we are not causally responsible for their suffering – so we are 
not required to free them from snowdrifts, slake their thirst in a drought, 
nor rescue them from predators. We can think of them as in some sense 
living in “sovereign” autonomous communities (Goodin et al. 1997). This 
does not mean that we are not permitted assist them (as, for instance, a 
view based on non-interference with human-independent processes would 
maintain). The claim is just that it is not wrong if we do not.
This contextual view has a number of implications, some useful, some 
more difficult or troubling. One implication is that – unlike on conse-
quentialist views such as that proposed by McMahan (2010) – we have no 
reason to try to reduce overall suffering in nature by managing or shaping 
nature differently, trying to find ways to reduce predation, disease and the 
harshness of wild conditions, assuming we could do so successfully. This 
seems to me to be a helpful implication. However, there are two obvious 
and serious complications. 
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The first is that this contextual view draws on what Nozick (1974, 155) 
calls a “historical principle” where past circumstances or actions can be 
a direct justification for different entitlements. However, as with similar 
human cases, the story of entanglement may not be clear, and this may lead 
to doubts about who is responsible for assistance, and whether the argu-
ment depends on some kind of disputed account of collective responsibil-
ity (for instance, who is responsible to assist a diseased feral cat, several 
generations on from the individual who abandoned its ancestor?). This 
concern about who bears responsibility for what is particularly difficult in 
the case of some domesticated and feral animals. However, for the pur-
poses of this paper, this problem is much less acute: in the context of wild 
animals, the argument is that no-one has a responsibility to assist, because 
there is no prior morally-relevant entanglement. 
But this leads to the second, more troubling question. What counts, in 
a time of globally pervasive human influence, as a “truly wild” animal, and 
a “morally relevant entanglement”? Wildlife management, human develop-
ment of animal habitat, anthropogenic fires, and so on, have affected many 
wild animal’s lives; and anthropogenic climate change is already impacting 
many wild animals’ habitats. Do more diffuse anthropogenic phenomena 
such as climate change create special obligations to assist wild animals? I 
do not have room to do justice to this important complication here (though 
I am planning future work on this). However, here are some considera-
tions, in brief. 
First: accepting that anthropogenic environmental change does create 
special obligations to animals does not undermine the contextual argument; 
it just means that now most sentient animals have been drawn into relations 
with humans that generate special obligations, just as human societies now 
have entanglements that draw in virtually all people. This makes the position 
more demanding; but then, its objection to a requirement for humane wild 
intervention was not based on the over-demandingness of the requirement.
Second, any special obligations flowing from climate change are likely 
to be weaker than those flowing from (say) deliberate selective breeding 
for dependence. The impacts of climate change on animals are harder to 
identify, less intentional and certainly less predictable than selective breed-
ing (though this argument may weaken over time) (see Nolt 2011). Over 
time, more vulnerable animals will shift geographical location (if they can) 
or else disappear; and animals from less vulnerable species will move in; 
such successful incomers would not need assistance. And finally there is 
no point offering assistance that is ineffective; given the degree of climate 
change to which we are now committed, there will be some cases where 
assistance would not constitute a benefit over time.
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While these factors may require us to think very hard about what more 
diffuse negative impacts may cause us to owe to wild animals, they do not 
obviously undermine the basic argument that we may have special obliga-
tions to assist wild animals, if we are (even diffusely) responsible for put-
ting them in situations that negatively impact on their welfare.
To conclude: the contextual argument presented here defends the posi-
tion that we are not normally required to assist wild animals, resting on the 
claim that requirements to assist, unlike requirements not to harm, depend 
on the existence of some kind of morally-relevant context or relation. This is 
not a defense of the view that we are never permitted to assist wild animals, 
nor that we are never required to assist wild animals; we may be required to 
assist them when we have harmed them and it is possible for us to succeed 
in helping them. The contextual view allows that assistance to distant suf-
fering humans is likely to be required, on the basis of global inter-human 
entanglements, even when it is not required for distant suffering animals. 
And finally, defending this contextual argument is not intended to imply 
that other arguments could not generate similar conclusions. Some kinds of 
consequentialism may in fact do so, but these arguments rest on contingent 
empirical facts, rather than on in-principle arguments. 
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